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The experience of  the less developed country borrowers is filled with irony, 
but nowhere is this more apparent than in the Philippines. At the end of  the 
1970s the country seemed to have joined the third generation of  rapid Asian 
industrializers. Economic growth had accelerated in the mid-l970s,  despite 
the  first  oil  shock  and  the  recession  in  the  industrialized  countries. 
Investment  rates  were  comparable  to  those  of  Korea.  The  structure  of 
exports had  shifted rapidly  away from primary commodities,  toward  light 
manufacturing goods. Even agriculture expanded, as irrigation investments 
and new strains of rice turned the Philippines into a rice exporter by the end 
of  the  decade.  Economic policy  was  managed  by  a  group of  university- 
trained  technocrats,  who enjoyed the  confidence of  the country’s external 
creditors, and the Philippines was among the first countries to take advantage 
of the new, extended financing facilities of  the IMF and the World Bank. The 
Philippines was also favored by  the international banking community, and 
the  “Philippine  desk”  became  a  path  for  rapid  advancement within  the 
international divisions of  many commercial banks. 
All of this would unravel rapidly after 1980. The Philippines was hit hard 
by  the  second oil price shock,  as  were other LDCs. A domestic financial 
crisis led to the failure of a series of  major companies, many of which were 
bailed out by  the government at great expense.  The balance of  payments 
deficit widened  and  was  financed by  more rapid  external borrowing.  The 
domestic growth rate fell year after year, even as surrounding countries were 
beginning to recover  from the  world recession.  Political opposition to the 
government  of  President  Ferdinand  Marcos  grew  and  spread  to  more 
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conservative sectors of the society.  But a watershed was reached  when  the 
most prominent opposition politician,  Benign0 Aquino, was assassinated as 
he stepped off his plane on his return from exile in August 1983. In October 
the Philippines announced  that it could no longer  meet  its debt repayment 
obligations,  the  first,  and  so  far  the  only,  Asian  country  to  declare  a 
moratorium in the current debt crisis. 
The reputation of the country for prudent economic management  and the 
reputations of its technocrats were shattered by the events of the 1980s. The 
Philippines had  one of  the best debt  reporting  and  control  systems of  any 
LDC, and had  carefully  managed  its obligations  in the  1970s, lengthening 
maturities  and  refinancing  on better  terms.  But  in  the  1980s  it  resorted 
increasingly to short-term borrowing,  raising the vulnerability of the country 
to a cutoff of external funds. Much of this short-term borrowing was hidden 
through  duplicate  financing of  trade transactions,  or through  borrowing  in 
the offshore market by domestic banks’  foreign currency deposit units. The 
net position of  the  monetary  authorities  was  also obscured  by  a deliberate 
overstatement of the country’s foreign exchange reserves of as much as $1.1 
billion, or half of the reported total.  In the end, the Philippines waited until 
its exchange reserves were nearly exhausted before declaring a moratorium, 
and  the  country  failed  to  draw  on  the  standby  lines  of  credit  that  it  had 
negotiated  and paid for. 
But  the  fragility  of  Philippine  economic  growth  was  nowhere  better 
illustrated  than  in  the  loans  of  the  major  state  financial  institutions,  the 
Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines. The 
asset portfolios of these two institutions literally dissolved in the  1980s. By 
1986 their nonperforming assets totaled over $7 billion, or almost a third of 
the Philippines’ total external debt. The deficits of state financial institutions, 
including the central bank, had become a huge drain on the resources of the 
government,  amounting to 5 percent  of GNP in  1986. 
The buildup of external debt in the Philippines took place in a relatively 
short period of time, from 1975 to 1983. During this period the Philippines, 
like a number of LDCs, took advantage of the availability of bank credit and 
low world real interest rates to sustain domestic growth in the wake of the 
first oil shock. All of  these LDC borrowers were hit by the triple shocks of 
the early 1980s-higher  oil and reduced commodity prices, higher world real 
interest rates, and recession in the industrialized countries.  The Philippines, 
with its high dependence on imported oil and short-term debt, was hit harder 
than most, and the breaking point came just as the industrialized world was 
recovering from its prolonged recession. 
But  the  Philippine  debt  crisis  was  not,  at  base,  due  to  a  series  of 
unfavorable  external  events.  The  country  had  developed  a  borrowing 
momentum  that  could  not  be  sustained,  and  the  external  shocks  merely 
accelerated a process that would have occurred eventually.  The roots of  the 
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structure built up in the years since independence, particularly in the period 
after  1972. Foreign  borrowing  played  a  crucial  role  in  both  spheres.  It 
produced economic growth well above what the domestic economy and the 
domestic  policy  environment  could  have  achieved,  providing  temporary 
internal and  external legitimacy to  an  authoritarian government.  External 
funds  also  played  an  important  role  in  building  and  maintaining  a  new 
domestic  political  structure  that  Marcos  established  to  challenge  the 
traditional  Philippine  elite.  However,  in  the  end,  both  the  economic 
environment and the political structure created under the martial law  years 
(1972-81)  were  inimical  to  the  ability of  the  Philippines to  sustain and 
service foreign debt,  and the Philippine position unraveled quickly in  the 
more adverse environment of the 1980s. 
This study examines the features of the Philippine economy and Philippine 
politics that led to the rapid buildup of debt and the equally rapid spiral into 
recession and debt crisis. It also analyzes the prospects and problems faced 
by  the  current  government  of  President  Corazon  Aquino  in  promoting 
economic  growth  and  dealing  with  the  debt  burden  inherited  from  the 
Marcos regime. The two are quite closely related. For just as the Philippine 
debt crisis was not due solely to external events, the economic problems that 
the  Philippines now  faces  go  well  beyond  its  external  debt  burden  and 
restricted access to foreign capital. The problems in the Philippines are the 
same as they have long been-how  to achieve rapid and sustained economic 
and employment growth. 
1.1  History and Background 
The Philippines is  an  archipelago composed of  some 7,000  islands,  of 
which about  1,000 are inhabited. However, the bulk of the land mass and 
population  are  on  the  northern  island  of  Luzon,  the  southern  island  of 
Mindanao, and a cluster of central islands called the Visayas. The climate is 
tropical,  and  the  country  is  rich  in  natural  and  marine  resources.  The 
Philippines is a major sugar producer, accounts for about 60 percent of world 
exports of  coconut products,  and is an exporter  of  copper and gold.  The 
Philippines was at one time a major exporter of  logs and lumber, but the 
supply of  these has been greatly reduced by  deforestation and more recent 
attention to  conservation.  The  country  is  subject  to  the  vagaries  of  the 
weather, and typhoons or drought can cause major disruptions in agricultural 
production. The Philippines has a population of 57 million, somewhat larger 
than Thailand and well above that of Korea. The population is ethnic Malay, 
although the Philippines has experienced waves of Chinese immigration and 
intermarriage. 
The Philippines was a colony of  both  Spain and the United States,  and 
each  played  an  important  role  in  shaping  the  country.  Spain  brought 
Catholicism, now practiced by  80 percent of the population, and a system of 376  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
administration,  modeled  after that of Mexico, that divided  the country  into 
large estates, or encomiendus, that were given to Spanish settlers and to the 
church. The United  States  gained control  in  the Philippines  in  1900 as  a 
result of the Spanish-American War, and administered the colony until  1946. 
The United  States shaped  the  language, educational system, and political 
institutions of  the Philippines,  but relied on the existing Philippine elite and 
never  effectively  challenged  the  land  tenure  system  inherited  from  the 
Spanish colonial period. 
The population  growth  rate  is  about  2.5  percent  per  year,  one of  the 
highest in the region, and has led to considerable  pressure on the land. Up 
until  the  mid-1960s  this  was  met  by  extending  the  area  of  cultivation, 
particularly  by  movement of  Christian  settlers  into the underpopulated  and 
largely  Moslem  area  of  Mindanao.'  Since  the  mid-1960s,  increasing 
population  has  meant  greater  population  densities, an increase  in  landless 
laborers  in  the  rural  areas, and migration  to the major  cities, particularly 
Manila.  Land tenure and land inequality  are powerful  and difficult political 
issues. 
1.2  Politics and Institutions 
The  Philippine  political  system  before  1972 can  best  be  described  as 
oligarchic-a  small number of wealthy,  landed families dominated  politics, 
as  well  as the  economic life  of  the  country.  The extended family  was a 
particularly  strong source of  identification and status in the Philippines,  and 
patron-client  relationships  linked the population  to the oligarchic  family  in 
its  area  or  region.  The  result  was  to  give  Philippine  politics  a  highly 
personalized  and  regional  orientation.  The elite  families competed among 
themselves  in  national politics,  primarily  for the  presidency  and the  spoils 
that office could bring. (No president was re-elected until  1969, and the only 
presidents not to come from the elite group were Ramon Magsaysay  in the 
1950s and Ferdinand Marcos.) The system that resulted  was a conservative 
one, generally protecting the interests of the elite, but the competition among 
elite groups allowed some democratization of the political process and some 
representation of the interests of  regions and localities,  despite the weakness 
of local government. 
The strongest political interest group after independence  in  1946 was the 
sugar lobby, which dominated Congress in the early years of the Republic. 
The sugar  lobby,  and  to  a  lesser  extent other members of  the  traditional 
export sector, were the primary force in pressing for more liberal trade and 
exchange rate policies-avoiding  overvaluation  of the peso and limiting the 
degree  of  import protection.  But  the  sugar industry's  political  power was 
weakened  by  its poor  public  reputation.  The sugar barons  were  viewed  as 
reactionary, self-serving, and already heavily favored, both by the U.S. sugar 
quota (which amounted to about a million tons per year at roughly twice the 377  PhilippinesKhapter 1 
world  price)  and  by  almost  nonexistent  taxation  on agricultural  land  and 
income. 
Challenging  the  sugar lobby  in  Congress, and eventually  winning  over 
them,  was  the  domestic  import-substituting  industrial  sector.  This group 
barely existed before the 1950s, but by the end of  the decade had emerged as 
a  powerful  political  force.  Sheltered  by  protection,  benefitting  from 
overvaluation of the currency, and shrouded  in economic nationalism, their 
conflict  with  the  traditional  sector  over  trade  and  exchange  rate  policy 
formed the most important political debate of the late 1950s and 1960s. 
The political  institutions of  the Philippines  were  patterned  after those of 
the  United  States, with  a president,  two houses  of  Congress, and a court 
system, each with  its  areas of  responsibility.  The presidency  was  in  fact 
much  stronger  in  the  Philippines.  The Congress  was  an  arena  of  “elite 
representation,  horse-trading,  and  corruption”  (Abueva  1979,  49)  that 
served as a training  ground for presidents.  Little of  a programmatic  nature 
came out of  the Congress; it had effectively ceded budgetary authority to the 
president,  But  it  was  a  strong  force  on  matters  of  taxation,  foreign 
investment,  and alien (Chinese) business operation. Local governments had 
a very small role, having little power of taxation and being dependent on the 
national government for budgetary  support. 
Presidential politics had a large patronage component. “What are we here 
for?”  was the response  of one Philippine  president  when questioned  about 
corruption  in  his  administration.  The president  effectively  controlled  the 
operations of the central bank’s Monetary Board, and the allocation of credit 
through  state  and  private  financial  institutions  was  used  as  a  means  of 
rewarding business supporters (Power and Sicat  197 1, 67). Macroeconomic 
policy had a strong electoral cycle, as incumbent presidents tried repeatedly 
to assure their re-election through public expenditure increases. 
1.3  Role of  Government 
The  postwar  period  saw  a  tremendous  rise  in  the  importance  of  the 
Philippine  government  in  influencing  domestic activity,  particularly  in  the 
1970s. Indeed, much of  the story of  the Philippine  debt crisis described in 
this study is the expansion of the national government’s  economic role and 
the political strategy behind it. However, the starting point for the Philippine 
government  was  much  smaller  than  that  of  governments in  other LDCs. 
Government expenditure as a share of GNP in the Philippines averaged only 
11 percent in the 1950s and 1960s, versus 20 percent in Thailand and Korea, 
and 24 percent in Malaysia. Gross investment by government was only about 
one-fifth  of  total  government expenditure.2 Much  of  this  was  devoted to 
political patronage in the annual Public Works bill (termed  “the Pork Barrel 
Bill”  by domestic legislators),  so that there was little systematic attempt to 
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The  small  scale  of  government  reflected  the  ideological  bent  of  the 
American colonial administration, but also coincided with the interests of the 
Philippine  landed  aristocracy  and  the  commercial  sector,  the  dominant 
political  groups.  Although  the  Philippine  government  had  some  early 
experience  with  state-owned  enterprises,  the  prevailing  orientation  was 
toward private sector activity. Public utilities, transport, and communications 
were  largely  in  private  hands.  Although  the  importance  of  public 
corporations  and  market  intervention  would  grow  tremendously,  the 
Philippine government would continue to publicly maintain the primacy of 
the private sector. 
Tax revenue as a share of GNP has been relatively low in the Philippines, 
consistent with  the small government expenditure share.  But beyond  this, 
difficulties in  raising  tax  revenues have been  persistent constraints on  the 
mobilization of domestic resources through the public sector. The utilization 
of  potential tax bases has been low by  international standards, as has been 
the  efficiency  of  collection  of  existing  taxes.3  The  division  of  political 
authority  before  1972 gave  the  president  de  fact0  authority  in  allocating 
expenditure, but the Congress retained control over tax matters and resisted 
attempts to increase the revenue raised through the tax system. Of particular 
importance in the  Philippines is the fact that  agricultural property, and to 
some extent agricultural income, almost completely escaped taxation. As  a 
result, export taxes have in part been used  as substitutes for other taxes on 
the agricultural sector. 
1.4  Economic Nationalism 
Nationalism has been a persistent theme in Philippine politics and has had 
a large economic component. There has been a strong desire to “Filipinize” 
the country’s economy-to  reserve land ownership, use of natural resources, 
and participation in many economic activities to native Filipinos. Nationalist 
sentiment and policy has been directed against foreign investors, but  also 
against “aliens”-non-Filipino  citizens, who are mostly Chinese. 
Almost  from the beginning of  the American colonial period  there was 
strong pressure  for  independence,  from  Filipinos  and  also  from  political 
groups in the United States opposed to the retention of colonies. As early as 
1916 the  United  States committed itself  to  eventual independence for its 
Asian colony. U.S.  legislation in  1934 established a commonwealth in the 
Philippines, with  a  ten-year transition to  full  independence,  although the 
process was interrupted by the Second World War. After the war, the United 
States sought  to  assure continued privileges  for  American  citizens  in  an 
independent  Philippines.  Using  the  leverage  of  withholding  its  aid  and 
rehabilitation funds, the United States forced the country to accept a series of 
constitutional amendments and policies that would assure Americans parity 
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Trade  Agreement  Act  of  1946 (the  Bell  Act),  which  required  that  U.S. 
citizens be given the same rights as Filipinos to own land, exploit natural 
resources,  and  operate public  utilities.  The  Bell  Act  included  provisions 
which established free trade between the two countries, although Philippine 
exports of  sugar, coconut oil, and cordage were still subject to U.S. quotas. 
The act also prohibited export taxes and required U.S. approval before the 
Philippines could change its exchange rate.  Although the provisions of  the 
Bell Act were softened by the Laurel-Langley Agreement of  1955, and under 
that agreement the parity amendments expired in 1974, the provisions forced 
upon the Philippines after World War  I1 were a source of  much resentment, 
as  well  as  a  limitation  on  Philippine policy  choices.  The  measures that 
shaped Philippine trade and industrial policy-the  adoption of import quotas 
and industrial incentives-were  in part due to the limited flexibility of  the 
Philippines  in  addressing  its  first  balance  of  payments  crisis  after 
independence. 
The areas of particular emphasis in nationalist policy have included import 
and retail trade, natural resources and general land ownership, and processing 
and marketing of  agricultural products. Import trade in  the late  1940s was 
dominated  by  Western  and  Chinese  firms.  However,  the  import  controls 
adopted  in  1950  gave  the  Philippine  authorities  a  powerful  weapon  for 
increasing the share of  Philippine nationals. The import control legislation 
required  that  40  percent  of  import  licenses be  allocated to  new  Filipino 
importers, with the share gradually increasing over time. By  1956 the import 
quota allocations to Filipinos exceeded 75 percent (Golay 1961, 321). 
Filipinization  policy  in  natural  resources  and  in  public  utilities  was 
hampered by  the parity  amendments,  which  gave American investors the 
equivalent  of  Filipino  status  until  the  expiration  of  the  Laurel-Langley 
Agreement  in  1974. However,  regulatory opposition to rate  increases was 
used to encourage the sale of  American-owned utilities, and the Philippine 
Supreme Court’s  decision  in  the  Quasha  case  (Republic v.  Quasha,  17 
August  1972), that  property  rights acquired under the  parity  amendments 
would lapse in 1974, encouraged American disinvestment in natural resource 
industries (Golay 1983, 142-43,  151-53). 
In  contrast  to  the  highly  sensitive  areas  discussed  above,  Philippine 
industrialization policy  has  taken  a  more  liberal  stance  toward  foreign 
ownership. Philippine policy did not discriminate against foreign industrial 
investors until 1957, when foreign exchange allocation for capital goods and 
raw  materials import was used to favor Filipino firms (Golay 1961, 259-60, 
330-33).  During the 1950s, foreign investment in manufacturing industries 
increased ~ubstantially.~  The Philippines went through an import decontrol 
period in  the early  1960s, followed by  a period of  sluggish manufacturing 
growth and excess capacity. Under pressure from domestic manufacturers, 
government guidance of  investment and preferences for Filipinos increased. 
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in nonpioneer industries and a gradual transfer of ownership to Filipinos  in 
pioneer  industries.  The act  also established  a  Board  of  Investments (BOI) 
which  was  given  considerable  latitude  in  administering  investment  incen- 
tives,  as  well  as  the  authority  to  limit  investment  in  “overcrowded” 
industries. 
Although  foreign  ownership  has  remained  a  sensitive  political  issue, 
foreign  direct  investment  has  not  been  an  important  source of  external 
capital for the Philippines.  Net foreign direct investment  inflows, shown in 
table  1.1,  have  been  a  small  proportion  of  domestic  capital  formation, 
among the lowest in any of  the ASEAN  (Association  of  South East  Asian 
Nations)  countries. The net investment  figures clearly  reflect  the swings in 
Philippine  trade  and  investment  policy.  The import  controls  of  the  1950s 
drew  foreign  investors  into  import-substituting  industries.  The  sluggish 
growth of  the manufacturing  sector during the decontrol period  (1961  -66) 
and the impending lapse of  the Laurel-Langley  Agreement is also evident in 
the reduction of foreign investment in the 1960s and early 1970s. This was a 
period  of  substantial  disinvestment  by  American  firms  in  mining, utilities, 
and other ind~stries.~  The imposition of martial  law in  1972 led to greater 
efforts to promote foreign direct investment,  but even during this period, the 
contribution of  direct  investment  to total  external  capital inflows remained 
quite small. 
1.5  Trade and Industrial Policy 
The thrust of  postwar  Philippine  trade  and industrial  policy  has been  to 
encourage  the  development  of  industries  serving  the  domestic  market, 
through  import  protection  and  substantial  investment  incentives.  In  the 
process, the country has discriminated  against its export sector, particularly 
Table 1.1  Foreign Investment in the Philippines (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
A. Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 
1946-50  1951-55  1956-60  1961-65  1966-72  1973-78  1979-83 
Average annual inflow  20.2  28.2  26.9  -  10.8  -13.6  99.6  44.4 
Percentage: 
of  GNP  .67  .66  .45  -.I8  -  .I6  .65  .I2 
of  Capital formation  N.A.  3.2  2.8  -  1.4  -.76  2.3  .42 
B. Book Value of  U.S. Investment (year end) 
1950  1960  I966  1972  1979  1985 
Total stock  149  414  519  608  913  1.032 
Suurces: A: Central bank, Annual Report, various issues; B:  U.S.  Department of  Commerce 
Nore:  N.A.  = not available. 381  PhilippinesiChapter  1 
the traditional  commodity  exports, through  currency  overvaluation  and, in 
some cases, export taxes.  Two attempts to liberalize the trade regime  and 
encourage  exports-ne  in  the  early  1960s  and  the  second  in  the 
1970s-were  in  the  end  unsuccessful,  in  part  because  the  objective  of 
protecting existing domestic industry was never abandoned. 
A  balance  of  payments  crisis  in  1949  led  the  Philippines  to  impose 
licensing requirements based on the degree of “essentiality”  of the import. 
This led to the development  of a domestic  manufacturing  sector providing 
“nonessential”  consumer  goods,  as  well  as  a  group  of  industrialists 
dependent on import protection.  Initially the policy was successful, spurring 
foreign  direct  investment  and  investment  by  domestic  residents,  and  the 
country’s growth in the early 1950s was among the highest in the region. In 
addition,  as  mentioned  above,  the  allocation  of  import  licenses  was  a 
powerful tool for Filipinizing the import trade. 
Slowed growth toward the end of the 1950s, foreign exchange shortages, 
charges  of  corruption  surrounding  the  allocation  of  licenses,  and  the 
continuing influence of the sugar industry led to a phased elimination of the 
import  licensing system,  as well as a devaluation  of the peso,  in the early 
1960s.  Although  exports  of  the  traditional  sector  increased,  the  overall 
experience of  decontrol was disappointing.  The economy continued to grow 
sluggishly,  with the manufacturing  sector remaining particularly  weak, and 
the devaluation brought about a sharp rise in the domestic inflation rate. The 
period did not see the development of  significant new exporting industries. 
The experience  of  the  decontrol  period  profoundly  influenced  those  on 
both  sides of  the  trade  policy  debate. Excess  capacity  and  low  profits  in 
manufacturing  led  to increased  economic  nationalism,  as well  as calls  for 
government  intervention  on  the  part  of  the  domestic  industrial  sector. 
Proponents of trade liberalization and export promotion shifted their ground 
after the decontrol of the 1960s and advocated export promotion as a way of 
developing new industries without  challenging the existing system of trade 
protection. In the remainder of the decade there was a gradual increase in the 
level  of  trade  protection,  as  well  as the  adoption  of  industrial  incentive 
systems which encouraged  industries that exported, but also industries that 
served the domestic market. 
1.6  The First Marcos Administration, 1966-69 
The events of  this  period  are in  many  ways  a  striking  precursor  to the 
accumulation of external debt in the 1970s and early 1980s. The rapid rise of 
external  debt  during  the  first  Marcos  term,  much  of  it of  short maturity, 
culminated  in  a  balance  of  payments  crisis  in  1970, the  rescheduling  of 
external debts, and an IMF adjustment program. 
Ferdinand Marcos defeated Diosdado Macapagal in his re-election bid  in 
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program.  The  Marcos  administration  immediately  moved  to  accelerate 
economic  growth  and  was  more  aggressive  in  its  use  of  government 
expenditure and economic policy than previous Philippine administrations. 
During the initial years of Marcos’ first term,  fiscal and monetary policies 
turned decidedly expansionary. The national government greatly raised its 
capital  expenditures,  largely  concentrating  on  infrastructural  projects- 
irrigation, roads,  schools, and communications-in  the rural areas.  In  all, 
government expenditure rose in real terms by approximately 43 percent from 
1964  to  1968  (two  non-election  years),  and  the  share  of  government 
expenditure in GNP rose from  11.5 to  14 percent. The rise in expenditure 
was  financed primarily  by  borrowing,  both  domestic and external,  as the 
national government budget  shifted from a slight surplus to a deficit of  3 
percent of  GNP. 
On  the  monetary  side,  the  central bank  initiated  what  it  described  as 
“massive  credit  relaxation,”  lowering  the  discount  rate  and  greatly 
increasing  rediscount  ceilings.  An  industrial  rehabilitation  facility  was 
established  at  the  Development  Bank  of  the  Philippines  that  offered 
industrial loans for refinancing and the conversion of  some loans into equity. 
Between -1965 and 1967, domestic credit increased by 40 percent, compared 
to a rise in nominal GNP of  18 percent. 
The  stimulative program  of  the  Marcos  administration quickly  ran  up 
against  external  payments  difficulties.  The  increase  in  government  and 
private investment led to a 24 percent rise in imports in 1967 and a further 
increase in  1968. By  1968 the current account deficit reached 3 percent of 
GNP. 
The worsening external situation did not prevent the traditional run up in 
expenditure in the  1969 election year.  Marcos became the first Philippine 
president  to  win  re-election,  in  an  election  that  was  by  far  the  most 
expensive and  also the  most  violent  and  suspect of  any up  to that  point. 
Government expenditure rose by over 25 percent in  1969, and the deficit of 
the  national  government  tripled  in  that  year.  Most  of  the  increase  in 
expenditure was financed by  the central bank; the money supply rose by  20 
percent in the last four months of  1969 alone. 
The  increase  in  expenditure  by  the  government  and  the  outlays  of 
government corporations  and  financial institutions  had  been  financed  by 
extensive borrowing, both internal and external. Much of that borrowing had 
been short term. President Marcos explained to a business group in Manila 
in  early January:  “We  have  unfortunately  financed  the  foreign exchange 
requirements of our development with credits of  short maturities. I am told 
by  my  advisers that  because of  the increase in  short-term debts, the  total 
payment for interest and amortization this fiscal year ending June 1970 will 
take over half our export earnings.”6 A summary of  Philippine external debt 
in this period is contained in table 1.2. 383  Philippines/Chapter 1 
Table 1.2  Philippine External Debt,  1965-70  (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Public  Private 
F’ublic Medium  Short  Pnvate Medium  Short  Total  (% of  (% of 
Year  & Long Term  Term  &Long Term  Term  Debt  GNP)  Exports) 
1965  286  73  190  51  600  10  56 
I966  269  103  209  43  624  9  53 
1967  281  209  445  145  1,079  15  90 
1968  433  120  698  200  1,450  I8  126 
1969  480  196  959  276  1,912  22  173 
1970  738  63  1,049  287  2,137  31  162 
Source:  Central bank, Management of External Debt and Investment Accounts Division. Data includes IMF 
obligations. 
The  major  official  creditors  formed  a  Consultative  Group  for  the 
Philippines in January 1970 and agreed to restructure the external debt in 
return  for  Philippine  agreement  to  an  IMF  stabilization  program.  That 
program required that the peso either be sharply devalued or allowed to float. 
The Philippine government accepted the latter condition, and by year end the 
peso had fallen from 3.9 to 6.4 per dollar. 
1.7  Stabilization and Martial Law 
The early  1970s was  a period  of  economic  stabilization and  recovery, 
accompanied by a rapidly deteriorating political situation. The devaluation of 
1970, tighter  monetary  and  fiscal policies,  and  the external commodities 
boom  quickly  restored  external  balance.  But  the  increasingly  violent 
domestic  political  situation  would  culminate  in  the  suspension  of  the 
constitution and the declaration of martial law  in  1972. 
The macroeconomic outlines of this period are contained in table 1.3. The 
devaluation in  1970 was coupled with tighter fiscal and monetary policy as 
the government cut investment expenditure in  1970 and again in  1971. A 
rapid increase in exports moderated the fall in GNP during the stabilization. 
Some  of  this  was  due  to  the  movement  of  existing exports  into official 
channels, and the growth depended upon investments undertaken in the late 
1960s, but the export response to the devaluation was still impressive. By 
1972 GNP growth was above its previous trend and macroeconomic policy 
became more expansive. Current account balance was rapidly restored, and 
the rise in external commodity prices in 1973 resulted in an unprecedentedly 
large  surplus.  The  foreign  debt  position  of  the  Philippines  improved 
markedly  during  this  period,  as  moderate  borrowing  and  rapid  nominal 
income growth reduced the debt/GNP ratio sharply in the early 1970s. 
The most startling event of this period is the marked decline in real wages 
that occurred after 1969. Real wages for both agricultura1 and nonagricultural 384  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 1.3  Macroeconomic Indicators, 1%9-73  (annual percentage change, except 
where indicated) 
1965-68  1969  1970 
Real GNP 
Money supply (MI) 
Budget surplus (% of  GNP) 
Consumer prices 
Real wages (CPI) (index) 
Export volume 
Import volume 
Current account (% GNP) 
REER exports (index)a 
REER imports (index)= 
DebUGNP (70) 
4.9 





































































"REER  (real effective exchange rates) are defined as the export or import  unit value divided by the GDP 
deflator. 
workers fell by about 25 percent between  1969 and 1973. Furthermore, real 
wages were maintained at this level through 1980, despite a 40 percent rise in 
per  capita GNP over the  1970~~  The drop in real  wages  was at once the 
success and the failure of economic policy during the Marcos era. Low wage 
costs were the primary  engine behind  the rapid  expansion of  manufactured 
exports  during  the  1970s.  At  the  same time  the  failure  of  real  wages  to 
increase and the sluggish growth of manufacturing employment were reflected 
in increasing income inequality and absolute poverty in the Philippines in the 
martial law regime. High recorded rates of economic growth did not translate 
into improvements in the lot of  the Filipino masses. 
1.8  Political Deterioration and Martial Law 
The mixed  but generally positive results of  the  stabilization period were 
accompanied by  rising  domestic  political  tensions  and violence.  The  1969 
election,  in which Marcos had been returned for a second term, was a low 
point in the Philippine electoral process. Marcos had spent far more than any 
previous  incumbent  in  seeking  re-election  against  an  opponent  who  was 
generally  given  little  chance  of  success. The campaign  and  election  were 
also  more  violent  than  previous  elections;  by  one  estimate,  two  hundred 
people were killed during the campaign (Shaplen  1979, 21 1). The election 
greatly  heightened  political  animosities  and  spawned  violent  protests  by 
student groups in  1970 and  1971, directed against Marcos but also against 
the Philippine Congress, which was widely dismissed as corrupt, inefficient, 
and obstructionist. Public cynicism toward the government was increased by 
the constitutional convention that Marcos called in 1971, which was a thinly 
disguised  attempt  to  extend  his  hold  on  power  beyond  the  eight-year 
maximum in the existing constitution.  This period  also saw the reorganiza- 385  PhilippinesKhapter  1 
tion  and  heightened  activity  of  the  Communist  Party  of  the  Philippines 
(CPP). 
The domestic situation continued to deteriorate in  1971 and  1972. A hand 
grenade was  thrown  into a rally  of the opposition  Liberal  Party  in August 
1971, severely injuring candidates for the off-year congressional election. In 
the year that  followed there were bombings of  public buildings and almost 
constant  demonstrations.  Wealthy  Filipinos  were  kidnapped  and  held  for 
ransom. The New People’s Army (the military arm of the CPP) widened its 
activity  in  Luzon,  and  the  Moslem rebels  in  the  South  stepped  up  their 
attacks  on  Christian  settlers.  The  Philippine  constitution  permitted  the 
president to declare martial law in a time of national emergency, and Marcos 
considered doing so for some time. The pretext he eventually  used  for the 
declaration was  a bombing  attack on the  car of  his defense  minister, Juan 
Ponce Enrile, on 22 September 1972, an attack that Enrile later admitted had 
been faked. 
The evening of the attack, citing a conspiracy of leftist and rightist groups 
and the Moslem secessionist movement,  Marcos declared martial  law. That 
night,  hundreds  of  persons  were  arrested  by  the  military,  including 
opposition  politicians  and  journalists.  Radio  and  television  stations  were 
closed,  and  the  country’s  newspapers  shut  down.  The  Congress  was 
dissolved,  and  under  martial  law  powers,  Marcos  began  to  rule  by 
presidential  decree.  The constitutional convention  that was formed in  197  1 
continued, minus some dozen opposition leaders who had been detained, and 
in  1973  produced  a  draft  constitution  providing  for  a  transition  to  a 
parliamentary  form of government.  The length of the transition  period  was 
left to Marcos’  discretion,  and  the  draft constitution  also gave Marcos  the 
ability to dismiss  any member of  the judiciary.  The new  constitution  was 
ratified in a hastily organized referendum and upheld by the Supreme Court. 
The martial law government moved rapidly to restore public order and, in 
its words,  introduce a sense of  discipline in Philippine life. The Philippines 
at the time was a heavily armed society, with local administration often in the 
hands  of  regional  oligarchs  and  their private  armies.  The Philippine  army 
confiscated  nearly  half  a  million  guns  from  private  citizens,  moved  to 
disband  private  armies,  and  integrated  local  police  forces  in  the  national 
bureaucracy  (Abueva  1979, 36).  After  this  and  some  heavily  publicized 
executions, the incidence of violent crime dropped sharply. The new sense of 
discipline, or perhaps wariness, was evident in other forms of behavior. Tax 
collections rose significantly in the year after martial law, aided by the threat 
of  severe penalties and a tax  amnesty on the declaration of hidden wealth. 
The number of people filing income tax returns increased by a factor of four 
after  martial  law.  And  observers  recall  the  period  as the  first  in  memory 
when Filipinos actually queued for buses. 
Initially martial law  was met by public ambivalence.  The declaration had 
been  widely  anticipated  and  was  viewed  as a power grab  by  Marcos.  Yet 386  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
there was a widespread willingness to give Marcos and martial law a chance. 
The  disorder  of  the  early  1970s  had  frightened  many  people,  and  the 
restoration  of  public  safety  was  widely  appreciated.  There  was  also  the 
feeling shared by many  that the political system in the Philippines had not 
served  the  country  well;  few  mourned  the  passing  of  Congress.  Finally, 
although the factors that precipitated martial law were political  and security 
issues,  the  Marcos  administration  moved  quickly  to provide  an  economic 
justification for  “constitutional  authoritarianism.”  Marcos  himself  declared 
that the conquest of mass poverty and the democratization of wealth were to 
be the major aims of his “New Society.”  One of the first acts of the martial 
law government was to institute a heavily publicized land reform. 
Central  to  the  acceleration  of  economic  growth  and  the  distribution  of 
economic  benefits  promised  by  the  regime  was  a  greatly  expanded 
governmental  role  in  development. With  the  Congress  removed  from the 
budgetary  process,  Marcos  sent  orders  to  his  executive  departments  to 
prepare a list of  bottlenecks in each of their functional areas and to draw up 
proposals for investment projects. The planning mechanism was reorganized 
and  strengthened  with  the  formation  of  the  National  Economic  and 
Development  Authority  (NEDA).  Marcos  increasingly  staffed  government 
bureaus  with  technocrats-Filipinos  with  advanced  degrees  in  economics, 
business, and engineering-who  were in turn drawn by the prospect of rapid 
implementation of policy by  a progressive government. 
The result  was  a swift  increase  in government  expenditure,  particularly 
public  investment,  supported  by  somewhat  higher  tax  collections  and  an 
increased  resort to foreign  funds.  The growing  importance of  the  public 
sector  is  only  partially  indicated  by  the  rise  in  national  government 
expenditure shown in table 1.4. Much of the increased investment was done 
off the books of the national government by state-owned corporations in the 
energy, agricultural infrastructure, and transport areas. The last line of table 
1.4 shows the rapid  rise of total  public  investment expenditures,  including 
Table 1.4  Public Sector Expenditure, Revenue, and Investment (percentage of GNP) 





expenditure  12.7  14.3  11.7  16.0  15.2  14.8  14.4  15.7 
revenue  11.9  13.2  12.2  14.4  13.4  13.6  13.1  11.4 
surplus  -0.8  -1.1  0.5  -1.6  -1.8  -1.2  -1.3  -4.3 
investmenta  1.6  2.3  3.4  4.3  6.6  7.2  6.9  1.2 
Source:  NEDA, National Accounts Section. Bureau of  the Treasuly, Cash Operations Sraremenrs 
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those of  public corporations. By  1978 total public investment had risen to 7 
percent of  GNP, or 30 percent of total domestic capital formation. 
Martial  law,  and  the  administrative  and  policy  changes  that  quickly 
followed, met with a favorable response from the foreign aid and multilateral 
community. The flow  of  official development assistance from members of 
the OECD Development Assistance Committee (ODA) more than doubled 
after 1972.'  Support for an accelerated program of public investment can be 
seen  in  the World  Bank's  Country  Economic Report  on  the  Philippines, 
published in  1976: 
The  basis  for  the  structural changes that  are  expected  is  a  substantial 
increase in investment, both public and private,  which would move the 
economy  towards sustained growth  of  incomes and  employment and  a 
more  acceptable distribution of  wealth.  The  large  investment program 
cannot be  financed out of  domestic savings alone; large foreign inflows 
will be required. . . . 
Public  investment  in  infrastructure  will  need  to  be  raised  to  about 
US$l,OOO million a year by  1980 compared with the present level of about 
US$400 million (both at 1974 prices). With a GNP growth rate of about 7 
percent per year, public investment would need to be raised to at least 5 
percent of GNP compared with the present 3 percent. (15- 16, 26) 
There was a second force behind the growing importance of  the national 
government which, although it had an economic component, was primarily a 
matter of political consolidation. As described above, Philippine politics had 
been dominated by a relatively small number of wealthy families. It was still 
possible for outsiders to enter and  succeed in  politics,  but  the entrenched 
power  of  the  elites  in  the  Philippine Congress  had  successfully blocked 
policies inimical to their interests. Marcos himself was an outsider. Although 
from a well-to-do family in  the Ilocos region of  northern Luzon,  he  was 
viewed as a parvenu by  the traditional elite. 
With  martial  law,  Marcos  achieved  a  transformation  of  the  political 
structure in the Philippines, successfully entrenching and consolidating his 
own power, and at the same time establishing his own family and that of his 
wife in the upper rank of the Philippine elite. The key to this was a greatly 
expanded national government, both as a means of centralizing authority and 
displacing the regional powers that had characterized Philippine politics, and 
as a patronage machine for rewarding supporters and punishing opponents. 
The  use  of  patronage  was  by  no  means  new  to  Philippine politics,  but 
Marcos used it brilliantly, along with the authority that martial law had given 
him, to eclipse the elite that had controlled Philippine politics. 
Marcos undermined  the political structure of  the traditional families by 
cutting off their lines of  influence and by  breaking their local control. The 
Congress  was.  disbanded  with  the  declaration  of  martial  law,  and  the 
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stations,  depriving  Marcos’  opponents  of  much  of  their  voice.  The 
confiscation of guns, disbanding of private armies, and the integration of the 
local  police  into  the  Philippine  army  centralized  local  control.  Local 
elections for governors and mayors were abolished, and local representation 
was reorganized as barangay (village) councils. Marcos also made a bid for 
populist support with promises to democratize wealth and with land reform.’ 
While not  destroying  the economic bases of  his opponents, Marcos was 
able  to  effectively  threaten  them.  Through  confiscation  and  forced  sale, 
Marcos acquired much of the assets of the Lopez and Jacinto families almost 
immediately  after the declaration  of martial  law, and cowed other potential 
opponents.”  Most of  the remaining  elite  families, if  not  supporters of  the 
regime, made their accommodations to it. 
The  most  immediate  beneficiary  of  martial  law  was  the  army,  which 
greatly  expanded  in  size,  responsibility,  and  emoluments.  The  army 
expanded from about  60,000 at the time martial law was declared  to  more 
than 250,000 by the end of  1975. The military budget more than quadrupled 
between  1972  and  1976.  Military  officers  were  given  a  wide  range  of 
administrative and managerial authority, and in many cases sat on the boards 
of  state-owned  corporations.  Some  developmental  tasks,  such  as  road 
building, were transferred to military commands at greatly increased cost. To 
assure  loyalty  within  the  army,  Marcos also  filled  the  higher  ranks  with 
officers from his home province of  Ilocos Norte. 
The expansion of the scale of government in the 1970s and particularly the 
acceleration of  public  investment  expenditures greatly  increased  the ability 
of  the  Marcos government to  distribute patronage, both  to  enrich  Marcos’ 
close  associates  and  his  own family  and  to assure loyalty  in  key  sectors. 
Investment and construction projects were especially well-suited to distribu- 
tional  politics  of  this  sort, as  they  were  highly  visible  and  employment- 
creating  expenditures.  Furthermore,  construction  and  the  purchase  of 
equipment  offered  opportunities  for  padded  expenses,  inflated  prices, 
kickbacks  from  suppliers,  and  even  outright  diversion  of  funds.  The 
availability  of foreign funds and external borrowing  in the  1970s facilitated 
this process in a variety of  ways. Foreign exchange costs were a significant 
component of the developmental project costs, and the availability of  foreign 
funds increased the scale of  such expenditures beyond  the level of  foreign 
exchange resources  that  could  normally  have  been generated  by  the traded 
goods  sector.  Access  to  credit  had  been  a  traditional  tool  for  rewarding 
political  supporters,  and  foreign  borrowing  increased  these  resources.  In 
addition, foreign  borrowing  tended  to concentrate credit  allocation  in  the 
state; both lending by  the multilateral institutions and, increasingly,  lending 
by  commercial  banks  depended  on  sovereign  guarantees.  Finally,  in  an 
economy with capital controls and a black market exchange rate premium of 
varying degree, foreign exchange resources  offered  a particularly  attractive 
way to distribute, and hide, wealth. 389  Philippines/Chapter  1 
The growth  of  government influence  and patronage  operations was  not 
merely  a function of  increasing public expenditure. The extent to which the 
national  government  intervened  in  the  operation of  the  domestic market 
vastly increased under martial law. Some of  this intervention was to advance 
economic goals, such as price support and stabilization,  industrial develop- 
ment, energy supply, and the rescue of firms in financial distress. But much 
of  the  intervention  involved  capturing  and  channeling  economic  rents. 
Monopoly  and  monopsony  positions  were  created  in  key  industries, 
particularly  in the traditional export sector, exclusive rights were granted to 
particular  firms and  individuals,  and government power was used  to force 
the  transfer  of  assets  from  one  owner  to  another.  To  a  real  extent,  the 
Philippines under martial law developed a rent-seeking  and rent-distributing 
government, which over time would sap the energy of the domestic economy 
and which contributed  significantly to the economic crisis of  the  1980s. 
1.9  The Philippine Economy in the 1970s 
The new  martial  law  government was  the  fortunate beneficiary  of  the 
worldwide  upswing  in  commodity prices  of  1972-74;  in  the  first year of 
martial law there was a 13 percent rise in the terms of trade, an expansion of 
exports, and a 9 percent growth of  real GNP (table 1.5). Even with the oil 
shock, Philippine terms of trade improved in  1974, as copper and log prices 
nearly  doubled from their  1970-72  average and  sugar and coconut  prices 
tripled. I’ The fortunes of  the Philippines reversed in  1975 with the collapse 
of  international commodity prices, and by  1976 the country’s terms of trade 
were 29 percent below their  1970-72  average. Ironically,  1974 would mark 
Table 1.5  Macroeconomic Indicators, 1973-79  (annual percentage change, except 
where indicated) 
1965-72  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
GNP 
National government budget 




Money supply (M1) 
CPI 
Real wages (CPI) (index)” 
Export volume 
Import volume 
Terms of  trade (index)” 
Current account (% of  GNP) 
5.0  9.3  5.6  5.8  7.4  6.3  5.8  6.9 
14.3  11.7  16.0  15.2  14.9  14.8  13.7 
13.2  12.2  14.4  13.4  13.0  13.6  13.5 
-1.1  -1.2  0.5  -1.6  -1.8  -1.9  -1.2  -0.2 
11.3  12.3  24.0  14.5  17.1  23.7  13.4  11.2 
8.4  16.5  34.2  6.8  9.2  9.9  7.3  16.5 
97  75  61  64  67  62  65  69 
5.2  7.7  -  10.7  5.9  28.1  20.6  3.1  8.5 
3.5  -6.4  17.8  5.0  5.9  -2.8  18.2  8.9 
87b  90  91  70  62  56  62  65 
-0.5  5.0  -1.2  -5.6  -5.8  -3.6  -4.6  -5.1 
”1965-68  =  100 
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the peak of Philippine export prices; despite the inflation of the  1970s and 
early 1980s, the dollar prices of Philippine exports would never recover their 
1974 levels. 
Like other oil-importing  developing countries,  the Philippines was hit by 
both terms of trade deterioration and a slowdown  in the growth of external 
markets. Since the Philippines exported commodities and was dependent on 
oil imports for most of its energy, the change in external prices had a severe 
effect, amounting to a real income loss of  5.6 percent of GNP.” 
Philippine economic policy  in this period  was caught up in the transition 
to  martial  law.  The  new  government  had  liberalized  foreign  investment 
policy,  had  declared  an  end to rice  and  corn  tenancy  and  started  a  land 
transfer program, and had emphasized tax collection and severe penalties for 
evaders. The four-year economic plan prepared by the Marcos administration 
called  for  a  substantial  rise  in  the  government  expenditure  share  and  a 
doubling  of  the  share  of  government  spending  devoted  to  investment. 
Government expenditures  in real terms rose  17 percent in fiscal year  1973 
(July  1972 to June 1973), while outlays for infrastructure rose 50 percent  in 
the same period. 
The Philippine government made a deliberate decision after the oil shock 
to  continue  with  the  expenditure  plan  while  accelerating  its  energy 
component.13  The desire to maintain the momentum of martial law certainly 
entered  into the  decision.  But  the  decision  was  also in line  with  external 
advice and was widely  supported by the country’s economic advisers.  The 
mood  among  policymakers  in  the  wake  of  the  first  oil shock  was  in  fact 
optimistic. The martial law government was just getting started and had had 
some initial success. More technocrats were being added to the government 
ministries,  and a more rational,  development-oriented  policy  approach had 
been  announced.  There was  confidence  in  the  ability  of  the  economy  to 
adjust  to  the  external  price  changes  and  optimism  about  the  Philippines’ 
export  potential.  The  oil  price  shock  was  seen  as  something  of  an 
opportunity, a possibility  for making fundamental policy reforms. l4 
The Philippine government responded  to the external  shock with a huge 
increase in government expenditures; real outlays in fiscal  1975 rose by 40 
percent.  The  rapid  increase  in  expenditure  was  reflected  in  the  current 
account  deficit,  which  rose  to  over  5  percent  of  GNP.  The  Marcos 
administration sought additional aid flows and direct investment, but the gap 
was met primarily  by external borrowing. 
The strategy was successful in maintaining,  and even raising,  the rate of 
domestic economic growth-the  average GNP growth rate for the remainder 
of the decade was 6.2 percent per year, a higher sustained growth rate than 
the Philippines had had since the initial import substitution phase in the early 
1950s. The expansion was led by domestic investment, which increased by 
35  percent  in  real  terms  between  1974 and  1976. The share of  domestic 
expenditure devoted to investment jumped to almost 30 percent and stayed at 391  PhilippineKhapter 1 
that level  for the remainder of  the  decade. As indicated in  table  1.6, the 
primary  reason  for  this  was  a  huge  increase  in  government  investment 
expenditures, although private investment also increased in the initial years 
of  martial law. 
Philippine exports  grew at a rate  of  13 percent per year from  1974 to 
1980, placing the country in  league with  the most rapidly growing Asian 
exporters. l5 The decade also saw a transformation in  the product composi- 
tion of  Philippine exports. In  1970 over 90 percent of  Philippine exports 
were primary commodities or  slightly processed commodities. By  1979 the 
share of these products in Philippine exports had fallen below 50 percent. In 
their place were several nontraditional, labor-intensive, manufactured export 
products, the most important of  which were garments, semiconductors, and 
integrated  circuits.  There  was  a  high  import  content  to  Philippine 
manufactured exports, and the domestic investment boom kept capital goods 
imports high.  So, despite the rapid growth of  export earnings, the current 
account deficit hovered around 5 percent of GNP. 
With the rise in  the current account deficit after the first oil  shock, the 
country's foreign debt grew rapidly, nearly tripling between  974 and  1978 
(table 1.7). The public sector did most of the borrowing and held two-thirds 
of  the foreign debt of the nonbanking sector by  the end of  the decade. The 
Philippines borrowed  increasingly from  banks  in  the  form  of  loans  with 
floating interest rates.  But this  was true  of  all LDC  borrowers  during the 
1970s, and the shifts toward commercial terms and floating rates were less 
pronounced  in  the  Philippines  than  in  most  borrowing  countries.  The 
country's  policymakers  managed  the  debt  carefully  during  the  1970s, 
lengthening maturities and refinancing when better terms were available. As 
a  result,  the  debt  service ratio  (interest  and  amortization  payments  as  a 
percent of  exports) increased only slightly, reaching 21 percent by  1980. 
Few  of  the problems that the Philippines would face in the  1980s were 
evident  in  1979. The  Philippines  had  significantly increased  its  external 
indebtedness, but had  also raised its export and GNP growth rates. At  the 
Table 1.6  Investment and Savings Shares in GNP, 1970-79 










21.9  21.9  26.7  30.6  31.3  29.0  29.1  31.0 
16.9  15.8  18.5  23.7  25.1  23.8  23.9  25.8 
15.3  13.6  15.1  19.4  18.6  16.9  16.7  18.5 
1.6  2.3  3.4  4.3  6.6  6.9  1.2  7.3 
0.2  0.2  0.5  0.6  3.3  3.5  4.6  4.0 
6.1  6.1  7.6  10.2  13.3  13.3  12.R  14.0 
10.8  9.7  10.9  13.5  11.8  10.5  11.0  11.8 
21.7  27.0  25.4  25.3  25.4  25.8  24.4  26.6 
Source:  NEDA, National Accounts Section 
"Including capital consumption allowance. Table  1.7  Philippine External Debt (in millions of US.  dollars) 
I970  1974  1978  1980  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
Total external debt 
Nonmonetary debt 
Medium & long term 
Short term 
Monetary sector debt 
Memorandum  items: 
DebtiGNP (%) 
DebtExports of goods, 
Debt service ratio" 
Short term as % of 
services 
total external debt 
2,297  3,755 
2.088  2.726 
1.779  2,395 
359  33  1 









































33.2  25.5  44.5  49.0  62.8  72.7  80.6  81.7  92.9  84.1 
174  106 

















22.6  36.2  35.2  43.4  46.7  37.9  37.3  32.7  19.  I  13.2 
Source:  Philippine  central  bank,  Management of  External  Debt  and  Investment  Accounts  Division,  and 
central bank, Financial Plan Data Center. 
"Total interest payments plus amortization of  total medium- and long-term debt as a percentage of exports of 
goods and services 
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end  of  1979, the  Philippines  had  a debt/GNP ratio comparable to  that  of 
Korea. Its debt service ratio was higher  than Korea’s, but  was well  below 
that of  most Latin American borrowers. 
1.10  The Second Oil Price Shock and Its Aftermath 
The Philippine economic situation deteriorated rapidly after the second oil 
price  shock  in  1980. The government  again tried  to counter the  growing 
domestic  recession  by  raising  expenditure,  and  announced  an  ambitious 
program of energy and industrial  investment.  As a result, the public  sector 
deficit rose sharply, from 3 percent of GNP to 5.4 percent, and the current 
account deficit widened to 8 percent of GNP (table  1.8). 
Despite  the  sharp  jump  in  government  investment  expenditure,  the 
Philippines was not able to ride out the second oil shock. Real growth rates 
dropped each year after  1979. Here the Philippines  was in sharp contrast to 
neighboring Asian countries, which, although most suffered a terms of  trade 
shock during the same period, were much more successful in restoring rates 
of  economic growth and in generating exports (table 1.9). 
The dollar value of Philippine exports hit a peak in  1980 and then fell at 
an average rate of  almost 5 percent per year through  1983, the result not only 
of  weak international  prices,  but  also falling commodity export volumes. 
Slower domestic growth and higher world real interest rates severely affected 
major domestic firms, many of  them highly leveraged. A domestic financial 
crisis in 1981 brought about the failure of  several large firms, many of  which 
were  bailed  out  by  the  government.  Industrial  failures  continued  to 
proliferate,  leaving  the  government,  which  had  guaranteed  the  foreign 
borrowings of  many of these companies, with nonperforming  assets with a 
book  value in the billions of dollars. This in turn led to an increasing  fiscal 
burden on the national government, as it was forced to absorb the losses of 
the  two  government-owned  financial  institutions,  as  well  as  of  several 
government nonfinancial  corporations. 
Philippine  external  borrowing  accelerated  in  the  early  1980s, and total 
foreign debt nearly  doubled  between  1979 and  1982. Borrowing  increased 
under the pressure of a swollen current account deficit, but capital flight also 
accelerated  sharply in the early 1980s, and may have reached  5 percent of 
GNP in  1981 and  1982. Net  foreign  direct  investment  inflows  slowed to a 
trickle,  as growing disinvestment  offset direct investment  inflows. 
The cautious  borrowing  policy  of  the  1970s  disappeared  in  the  early 
1980s.  The  most  abrupt  change  was  the  increasing  use  of  short-term 
borrowing.  This was particularly  true of the public sector, which accounted 
for two-thirds of the increase in short-term debt outside the monetary sector. 
The  central  bank  also  borrowed  heavily  between  1980  and  1982  and 
encouraged  other banks to do the same by providing  swap arrangements.” 
Despite this borrowing, central bank reserves  fell by $2 billion (two-thirds) Table 1.8  Philippine Macroeconomic Indicators (percentage of GNP) 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
Real GNP (% change)  5.0  3.4  1.9  1.1  -7.1  -4.1  2.0  5.9  6.7 
Investment share GNP  30.7  30.7  28.8  27.5  19.2  14.3  13.2  15.4  18.2 
National government budget 
Government fixed investment  6.9  8.0  7.2  6.1  4.1  3.7  N.A.  N.A.  N.A. 
Expenditure  14.4  15.8  15.7  14.0  12.7  13.5  17.8  17.0  N.A. 
Revenue  13.1  11.8  11.4  12.0  10.8  11.5  12.8  14.6  N.A. 
Surplus/deficit  -1.3  -4.0  -4.3  -2.0  -1.9  -1.9  -5.0  -2.4  N.A. 
Investment  8.2  10.4  9.0  8.2  6.9  6.4  6.2  N.A.  N.A. 
Surplusideficit  -3.0  -5.7  -5.4  -3.2  -2.8  -2.2  -3.6  N.A.  N.A. 
Consolidated nonfinancial public sector 
Current account balance  -5.4  -5.4  -8.1  -8.1  -3.5  0.0  3.3  -1.6  -1.9 
MI (% change)  19.6  4.4  -0.1  38.3  3.5  6.5  19.0  22.2  13.9 
Inflation rate (CPI)  17.6  12.4  10.4  10.0  50.3  24.9  0.7  3.8  8.7 
Nore:  N.A. = not available. 395  Philippines/Chapter 1 
Table 1.9  Comparative Growth Rates for Selected Asian Countries, 1974-84 
GDP Growth Rates  Terms of  Trade Shocka 
1974-79  1980  1981  1982  1983  I984  I979 -  82 
Philippines  6.5  5.2  3.9  2.9  0.9  -6.0  -5.8 
Indonesia  6.9  9.9  7.9  2.2  4.2  5.8  +35.9 
Malaysia  7.1  7.8  7.1  5.6  6.3  7.6  -  8.9 
Thailand  7.8  5.8  6.3  4.1  5.8  6.2  -6.3 
Korea  9.7  -3.0  7.4  5.7  10.9  8.6  -3.8 
Growth of  Dollar Export Earnings 
Philippines  11.9  28.0  7.6  -7.1  1.6  -1.4 
Indonesia  15.8  43.0  11.9  -14.5  -6.4  11.4 
Malaysia  21.3  19.5  -8.6  2.4  13.7  17.7 
Korea  29.5  15.6  20.8  4.0  7.2  10.8 
Thailand  15.6  28.7  9.8  -2.0  12.9  -1.0 
Source:  Philippines:  NEDA  and  the  central  bank.  Others:  Asian  Development  Bank,  Key  Indicators  of 
Developing Members Countries.  and IMF. International Financial Statistics. 
"Terms of  trade shock equals percentage change  in terms of  trade  multiplied  by the share of  merchandise 
imports in GNP. 
from the end of  1980 to mid-1983, although this was not known at the time. 
By  1982 the  share  of  short-term  debt,  including  monetary  sector debt, in 
total debt rose to 47 percent, a much higher share than in other LDC debtors. 
The  Philippines  first  considered  declaring  a  moratorium  in  late  1982. 
However,  Marcos  demurred, apparently  unwilling  to  have  the  Philippines 
compared  to  Latin  American  debtors.  When  a  moratorium  was  finally 
declared in October  1983, Philippine foreign exchange reserves were nearly 
exhausted. 
The adjustment period  that followed was severe.  Domestic  industry was 
limited by the extreme shortage of foreign exchange, and capacity utilization 
rates below  40 percent  were  common. Investment  fell by  more  than  half. 
Per  capita  incomes  fell  back  to  their  level  of  the  mid-l970s,  erasing  the 
gains from the rapid growth period. And inflation soared to over 50 percent 
per  year,  only  to be  rapidly  reduced through  monetary  policy  so severe  it 
forced many  firms and  several  financial  institutions  to the  wall.  Although 
many factors were responsible for the election defeat of President Marcos in 
1986, the  wrenching  adjustment process  was  an  important contributor.  By 
the end  of  1986 the  legacy  of  the  martial  law economic  policy  would  be 
1974 income levels, a foreign debt almost equal to GNP, and a fragile new 
democracy. 
The crucial question for the Philippines is how things could have changed 
so rapidly.  How could a country that substantially raised its investment and 
growth  rates,  had  transformed  its  export  structure  toward  manufactured 
goods, and was often mentioned as one of the next generation of East Asian 
tiger economies,  collapse so quickly in the space of four years? 396  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
1.11  The Role of External Shocks 
The Philippines’ real income position and its ability to sustain its level of 
foreign  indebtedness  were  diminished  by  the  two oil price  shocks and the 
accompanying industrial country recessions. The second oil price shock had 
a much  more severe effect  than the first.  This time, income loss from the 
change in the terms of trade was larger, equivalent to 6.9 percent of  GNP. In 
addition, the terms  of  trade  deterioration  was  coupled  with  a  rise  in  real 
interest rates of almost  12 percentage  points, adding another 3.5 percent of 
GNP to the income loss. l8 Thus, the external shock totaled about 10 percent 
of GNP, which was among the largest for major LDC debtors. 
1.12  Philippine Policy and the Debt Crisis 
Although  the  Philippines  was hit  more severely by  external  shocks than 
most debtor countries, the debt crisis that occurred was not simply a result of 
the  second  oil  price  shock  and  the  rise  in  world  real  interest  rates.  The 
Philippines  had  developed  a  borrowing  momentum  that  could  not  be 
sustained,  and the country would have eventually  come to an external crisis 
even  if  the  shocks of  the  1980s had  not  been  there  to  hurry  along  the 
process. 
There were two fundamental  economic difficulties.  First, the Philippines 
failed to develop self-sustaining growth that would have eased the burden of 
servicing  its  external  debt.  Second,  the  country  failed  to  shift  resources 
toward the traded goods sector, as was required  both by its increasing debt 
burden  and  by  its  declining  terms  of  trade.  In  more  concrete terms,  the 
problems  were  poor  returns  from  investments,  difficulties  in  mobilizing 
domestic  resources  to  fund  investment,  and  the  maintenance  of  a  trade 
regime that did not sufficiently encourage exports. In  addition, the Marcos 
government  created  a  political-economic  environment  that  discouraged 
independent investment, led to capital  flight, and eventually  crippled  much 
of the productive economy. 
1.12.1  Investment Efficiency 
In retrospect  there were several weaknesses in the economic growth that 
the Philippines achieved in the 1970s. The first was its heavy dependence on 
the flow  of  investment  expenditure as a source of  aggregate  demand.  As 
indicated  in  table  1.10,  the  expansion  in  the  rate  of  fixed  investment 
accounted  for more than 40  percent of  the increase  in real domestic output 
between  1974 and  1979, while  the rise  in  construction  expenditure alone 
contributed  almost  30  percent.  Much  of  the  increase  in  investment  came 
from the public  sector, despite a very  small initial public  sector investment 
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Table 1.10  Sources of  Philippine Real GDP Growth, 1974-79 
Growth Rate  Contribution to  GDP Increment  Share of  1974 GDP 
Personal consumption  5.0 
Gross fixed investment  13.3 
of  which: Construction  21.4 
Exports  9.2 
GDP  6.5 
Memo: 
Private fixed investment  10.4 
Government fixed investment  24.8 
Government consumption  3.5 



















Source:  NEDA. National Accounts Section 
There is nothing inherently wrong with expanded  investment as a source 
of aggregate demand growth.  But if it is to be the basis of a higher rate of 
secular income growth, the investment level must be maintained, and it must 
generate sufficiently high growth in other sectors of the economy. Although 
difficult  to assemble  and  somewhat  sketchy,  the  evidence  here  is  that  the 
efficiency  of  investment  in  the  Philippines  was  lower  than  in  surrounding 
countries and, in turn, the failure of investment to pay out was an important 
contributor to the debt crisis of the early  1980s. 
The simplest measure of  the efficiency  of investment  in the aggregate is 
the ratio of the resulting growth rate to the amount of  investment that takes 
place. This is normally represented by its reciprocal, the ratio of the share of 
investment in GDP to the GDP growth rate, known as the incremental capital 
output  ratio,  or ICOR.  The lower a  country’s  ICOR,  the  smaller  is  the 
increase in the capital stock necessary  to produce a given increase in output 
and, therefore, in a sense, the more efficient is investment. l9 
In  table  1.11  we  compare  investment  ratios,  GDP  growth  rates,  and 
ICORs  for the  Philippines  and  selected  Asian  developing  countries.  As  is 
clear from the  table, the  Philippines  has  achieved  a high rate  of domestic 
investment,  but has been  less successful  in translating that  investment into 
economic growth.  The table also shows an increase  in the  ICOR from the 
pre-oil shock period. This was not unique to the Philippines, but occurred in 
all  countries  listed  in  the  table except  Thailand.  A  significant  part of  this 
increase was caused by  a shift of investment toward more capital-intensive 
industries in the 1970s, in part caused by higher oil prices.*’  We  investigate 
in  chapters  3  and  4  some  of  the  reasons  for  the  higher  ICOR  in  the 
Philippines.  Here we will  simply stress its importance for the real  income 
position  of  the country.  Had  the  Philippines  had  the  median  ICOR  of  the 
countries in the table (Malaysia’s),  its growth rate from 1974 to 1980 would 
have  been  8.3 percent  per  year,  and  real  GDP in  1980 would  have  been 
almost  12 percent higher. 398  Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 1.11  Comparative InvestmentlGrowth Rates 
Investment Rate”  GDP Growth Rate  Ratio (ICOR) 
1967-72  1974-80  1967-72  1974-80  1967-72  1974-80 
Philippines  20.5  29.3  5.27  6.26  3.88  4.68 
Indonesia  12.8  20.0  8.20  7.42  1.56  2.70 
Malaysia  18.2  25.8  N.A.  7.26  N.A.  3.55 
Thailand  24.3  26.1  6.46  7.48  3.77  3.48 
Korea  25.2  29.8  10.0  7.67  2.53  3.89 
Sources:  Philippines: NEDA, National Accounts Section. Others:  IMF, International  Financial Stafistics. 
Note:  N.A. = not available. 
%toss domestic capital formation as a percentage of GDP. 
1.12.2  Resource Mobilization 
The second  weakness  of  Philippine  economic  policy  was the  continued 
dependence on foreign borrowing to fund domestic investment. To maintain 
economic growth in the face of external recession, the Philippines increased 
government  expenditure  and  borrowed  abroad  in  1975.  But  the  current 
account deficit never narrowed and was still about 5 percent of GNP in 1979. 
By 1982, after the second oil shock, the deficit had risen to over 8 percent of 
GNP.  In  large  part  this  continued  deficit  came from the  inability  of  the 
Philippine government to close it budgetary gap. The expansion  in the size 
and  expenditure  of  the  national  government  was  not  matched  by  a 
corresponding increase in revenue generation (see table  1.4). This was true 
despite a number of  external program requirements  to raise the government 
revenue share and repeated  tax measures enacted by the Philippines. 
While the increase in the government budget deficit shown above in table 
1.5 is not dramatic, it covers only the national  government.  Much of what 
took  place  on  the  fiscal  side  in  the  Philippines  was  the  movement  of 
government  expenditure  and  government  borrowing  to  the  accounts  of 
state-owned  corporations.  No  consolidated  figures  exist  before  1978, 
although the increase in the activities of the state-owned firms may be judged 
from  the  investment  expenditures  given  in  table  1.4.  By  1978  the 
consolidated  budget deficit of the  nonfinancial  public  sector had reached  3 
percent of GNP, and this deficit ballooned in the  1980s. 
1.12.3  Trade and Exchange Rate Regime 
What  now  appears  crucial  to  sustaining  a  large  external  debt  is  a 
concomitant  expansion  of  export  capacity.  Here  the  Philippine  record  is 
highly  mixed.  Nontraditional  manufactured  exports  grew  rapidly  and 
increased their share of total exports from 6 percent in 1970 to 50 percent by 
1980.  But  the  overall  growth  of  exports  was  insufficient  given  the  high 
investment, high foreign borrowing strategy the country pursued. The share 
of merchandise exports in GDP was nearly the same at the end of the decade 399  Philippineslchapter 1 
as  it  was  at  the  beginning.  This  was  in  sharp  contrast  to  neighboring 
countries,  where  significant  export  deepening  took  place  (see  table  3.2 
below). 
Both fiscal policy and trade and exchange rate policy played key roles in 
the continued borrowing of the Philippines and in the country’s inability to 
respond quickly enough to the abrupt change in world product  and capital 
markets in the 1980s. But in addition to these two, there were other features 
of  the  Philippine  business  and  policy  environment  that  exacerbated  the 
problems  that  the  country  had  in  maintaining  growth  and  avoiding  debt 
difficulties.  These  include  ‘‘crony  capitalism’  ’-government  intervention 
and  monopolization  of  domestic  industry-as  well  as  weakness  of  the 
financial  system  and  weaknesses  in  the  system  of  debt  management  and 
control over capital outflows. 
1.12.4  The Martial Law Business Environment: Crony Capitalism 
An  integral part of  the  operation of  the Philippine economy during the 
period of rapid debt buildup was the development of  crony capitalism-the 
fostering,  through  a  variety  of  means,  of  a  small  group  of  Philippine 
businessmen,  including  the  president  and  his  family.  This  included  the 
standard measures of awarding government contracts, padding expenses, and 
providing kickbacks.  But crony capitalism went well beyond  simple graft. 
The most important aspect was the creation of  monopolies, either through 
direct intervention to control an industry or through granting exemptions or 
exclusive privileges to favored individuals. 
The corporate empires of the cronies were built on a mixture of  corporate 
extortion  and  high  financial  leveraging.  Outright  expropriation  was  done 
only at the outset of martial law. Later, less visible pressure was brought to 
bear on profitable firms to sell out to Marcos family members or to cronies. 
The  cronies  borrowed  heavily,  either  receiving  funds  directly  from 
government-owned  financial  institutions  or  borrowing  from  the  private 
market on the strength of their association with Marcos. With the decisively 
changed  financial  atmosphere  in  the  1980s,  both  in  the  Philippines  and 
externally, the crony groups proved extremely vulnerable. 
Crony  capitalism took  a  significant  toll  on the  behavior  of  the  private 
sector not associated with the Marcos government. Businessmen became less 
willing to invest and expand in the Philippines for fear of attracting attention 
and instead moved their money outside the country. By the early 1980s this 
movement had become a flood. 
1.12.5  Financial Sector and Debt Management 
The Philippine financial sector played a number of  supporting roles in the 
buildup to a debt crisis in  the Philippines. The first was the failure of  the 
system to mobilize sufficient resources  in financial form. Despite the high 
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of financial  mobilization  among East Asian  countries.  The second was the 
high degree of government participation in the financial sector and the extent 
to which financial flows were channeled to projects or individuals favored by 
the martial law government. 
But it was a series of financial crises starting in  1981 that accelerated the 
collapse of  the Philippine economy and made the stabilization period  more 
severe than  it  otherwise  would  have  been.  A  collapse  in  the  commercial 
paper  market  in  1981 led  to  the  first  round  of  business  failures  and  the 
beginnings  of  the  government’s  expanding  bailouts  of  the  private  sector. 
During the recession  of  1984-85,  credit to key sectors almost disappeared, 
forcing the collapse of  many private firms and growers. By  1986, after years 
of gyrations, financial institutions in the Philippines were almost unwilling to 
do any intermediation. 
The debt  management  system  of  the  Philippines  also contributed  to the 
crisis that the country faced in 1983. This system worked well in the  1970s, 
screening foreign borrowing requests, limiting total external borrowing,  and 
refinancing  existing  loans when  better  terms  were  available.  However,  the 
debt management system broke down badly in the 1980s, leaving the country 
with one of the highest percentages of short-term borrowing among all LDCs 
and  little  or no foreign exchange reserves.  The inability  to control  capital 
flight, particularly  in the early  1980s, accelerated the speed with which  the 
Philippine debt crisis amved. 
1.13  Conclusion 
The following  chapters  take a more  detailed  look  at each of  the  issues 
discussed in section  1.12. Public  sector expenditure  and revenue  mobiliza- 
tion,  including  that  of  the  government  corporate  sector,  are  examined  in 
chapter 2. In chapter 3 we deal with the trade and industrial policy regime in 
the Philippines and investigate further the sluggish performance of  much of 
the  country’s  industry.  Crony  capitalism  and  the .effect  that  it  had  on 
domestic economic performance is the subject of  chapter 4. In chapter 5 we 
examine the financial system and its role in the crisis. The debt management 
system and the growth of capital flight are covered in chapter 6. 
After the debt moratorium was declared in October  1983, the Philippines 
went through a successful, but very severe, stabilization period. In chapter 7 
we look at that adjustment and the negotiations that the Philippines had with 
the IMF and its external creditors.  Finally, in chapter 8 we examine the first 
three years of  the Aquino government and the prospects for the Philippines. 